This article relates four concepts present in the thought of Édouard Glissant (poetics, optionality, exteriority, and unlearning) to show that they are also present in different authors of decolonial theory. These concepts lead us out of the framework of modern hypercriticism and allow us to enter into a philosophy of relation that opens up new possibilities for intercultural encounters. Through the constant recourse to the contrast between Glissant and the decolonial school, the text goes through its classic themes, such (...) as the coloniality of power, knowledge and being, and decolonial pedagogy and feminism. (shrink)

Atticus vecut au IIeme siecle, probablement a la fin du regne de Marc-Aurele. Contre les doctrines de son temps qui cherchait a fusionner les theories de Platon et d'Aristote, Atticus pronait un platonisme epure, loin de tout eclectisme. Cette position philosophique lui valut l'hostilite de ses contemporains, notamment d'Ammonius, et compromit sa reputation aupres de toute la tradition posterieure, si bien qu'aujourd'hui nous ne connaissons ses oeuvres que de maniere indirecte, par Eusebe de Cesaree pour la plus grande partie. (...) Ainsi n'avons-nous de ses ecrits qu'une vision partiale autant que partielle. Il semble avoir ecrit un Traite de l'ame, et des commentaires de grands textes de Platon, comme le Timee ou le Phedon. La presente edition regroupe l'ensemble des fragments attribues, a ce jour, au philosophe neo-platonicien, notamment le texte Contre ceux qui se flattent d'interpreter Platon par Aristote. Une riche notice introductive fait le point sur les connaissances relatives a l'auteur et a son oeuvre, et fournit toutes les informations necessaires a la bonne intelligence cette vaste nebuleuse du neoplatonisme. De judicieux paralleles sont dresses en particulier avec Ammonius. Des notes accompagnent la lecture et sont developpees, en fin de volume, par des notes complementaires. L'ouvrage est en outre enrichi d'un Index Verborum ab Eusebio, d'un Index Fontium ainsi que d'un Index auctorum ab attico laudatorum. (shrink)

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

L’article fournit un exemple concret des possibilités qu’ouvre l’exploration des données numérisées, et notamment de la Toile, en matière de morphologie dérivationnelle. Il y a une soixantaine d’années, en se fondant sur un exemple unique (silvio-pelliqueste), Edouard Pichon avançait l’hypothèse qu’en contexte vélaire, le suffixe –esque pouvait, par un phénomène de dissimilation préventive, se voir remplacé par la finale –este. Depuis, aucun argument n’était venu étayer cette hypothèse, sinon peut-être des remarques hésitantes de Zwanenburg (1975) et de Björkman (1984) sur (...) la difficulté de trouver des dérivés en –esque après vélaire. Les données réunies confirment que l’adjonction de –esque à une base dont la dernière syllabe comporte une vélaire engendre des tensions dissimi-latives. Lorsque le contexte s’y prête, ces tensions se manifestent tantôt par l’effacement de certaines vélaires finales, tantôt par le maintien inattendu d’une voyelle finale précédée d’une vélaire. Elles se manifestent aussi, comme l’avaient entrevu nos prédécesseurs, par une moindre productivité de cette suffixation après les radicaux en vélaire. Dans l’établissement de ces résultats, l’utilisation d’un outil permettant de récupérer automatiquement sur la Toile des néologismes en fonction de leur terminaison, s’est révélée déterminante. Les recherches automatisées ont joué aussi un rôle capital quand il s’est agi de trouver des dérivés en ‑este et de montrer que ce suffixe n’était utilisé productivement qu’après vélaire, conformément à la conjecture de Pichon. (shrink)

Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judg- ments, whether people’s concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective (...) deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome- dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases. (shrink)

Our ability to acknowledge and recognise our own identity - our 'self' - is a characteristic doubtless unique to humans. Where does this feeling come from? How does the combination of neurophysiological processes coupled with our interaction with the outside world construct this coherent identity? We know that our social interactions contribute via the eyes, ears etc. However, our self is not only influenced by our senses. It is also influenced by the actions we perform and those we see others (...) perform. Our brain anticipates the effects of our own actions and simulates the actions of others. In this way, we become able to understand ourselves and to understand the actions and emotions of others. -/- This book is the first to describe the new field of 'Motor Cognition' - one to which the author's contribution has been seminal. Though motor actions have long been studied by neuroscientists and physiologists, it is only recently that scientists have considered the role of actions in building the self. How consciousness of action is part of self-consciousness, how one's own actions determine the sense of being an agent, how actions performed by others impact on ourselves for understanding others, differentiating ourselves from them and learning from them: these questions are raised and discussed throughout the book, drawing on experimental, clinical, and theoretical bases. -/- The advent of new neuroscience techniques, like neuroimaging and direct electrical brain stimulation, together with a renewal of behavioral methods in cognitive psychology, provide new insights into this area. Mental imagery of action, self-recognition, consciousness of actions, imitation can be objectively studied using these new tools. The results of these investigations shed light on clinical disorders in neurology, psychiatry and in neuro-development. -/- This is a major new work that will lay down the foundations for the field of motor cognition. (shrink)

In this volume, three aspects are examined: a) normal subjects, where new findings on spatial behavior are described. b) brain-lesioned subjects, where the ...

According to one widely held view, a belief is fully justified only if it holds up against the strongest available counterarguments, and we can be appropriately confident that it does hold up only if there is free and open critical discussion of those beliefs between us and our epistemic peers. In this paper I argue that this common picture of ideal rational group inquiry interacts with epistemic problems concerning reasonable disagreement in a way that makes those problems particularly difficult to (...) resolve. By focusing on this idealized context, we get a clearer picture of the epistemic principles at issue. In the end, I argue that the best way to resolve the resulting epistemic conflicts is by appeal to the underdetermination of theory by evidence together with a principle of epistemic conservatism. (shrink)

What are the brain and cognitive systems that allow humans to play baseball, compute square roots, cook soufflés, or navigate the Tokyo subways? It may seem that studies of human infants and of non-human animals will tell us little about these abilities, because only educated, enculturated human adults engage in organized games, formal mathematics, gourmet cooking, or map-reading. In this chapter, we argue against this seemingly sensible conclusion. When human adults exhibit complex, uniquely human, culture-specific skills, they draw on a (...) set of psychological and neural mechanisms with two distinctive properties: they evolved before humanity and thus are shared with other animals, and they emerge early in human development and thus are common to infants, children, and adults. These core knowledge systems form the building blocks for uniquely human skills. Without them we wouldn’t be able to learn about different kinds of games, mathematics, cooking, or maps. To understand what is special about human intelligence, therefore, we must study both the core knowledge systems on which it rests and the mechanisms by which these systems are orchestrated to permit new kinds of concepts and cognitive processes. What is core knowledge? A wealth of research on non-human primates and on human infants suggests that a system of core knowledge is characterized by four properties (Hauser, 2000; Spelke, 2000). First, it is domain-specific: each system functions to represent particular kinds of entities such as conspecific agents, manipulable objects, places in the environmental layout, and numerosities. Second, it is task-specific: each system uses its representations to address specific questions about the world, such as “who is this?” [face recognition], “what does this do?” [categorization of artifacts], “where am I?” [spatial orientation], and “how many are here?” [enumeration]. Third, it is relatively encapsulated: each uses only a subset of the information delivered by an animal’s input systems and sends information only to a subset of the animal’s output systems. (shrink)

This article critiques the concept and discourse of social responsibility in terms of theoretical coherence, empirical salience, normative viability, and power/knowledge implications from a Marxist-institutionalist perspective. The social responsibility concept and discourse is found to be problematic along each of the above dimensions. The basic point can be stated succinctly: The concept and discourse of social responsibility are viable only in the absence of a historically grounded understanding of capitalist political economy. At the same time, however, the article argues that (...) social responsibility constitutes an influential ideology with material implications for stakeholder groups. (shrink)

The singular term theory maintains that that-clauses are complex singular terms which designate propositions. Though extremely well-supported, the theory is endangered by the existence of oblique that-clauses; that is, that-clauses occurring in what appear to be nonargument positions (e.g., ‘Lola was upset that Slick Willy had all the fun’). In this paper I argue that the best solution to the problem consistent with the singular term theory, invokes a construction-based grammatical theory. Such an approach challenges traditional views of semantic compositionality (...) by rejecting a central dogma of semantics, namely, that linguistic constructions contribute only trivial logical or quasi-logical information to semantic interpretation (e.g., function-application relations). (shrink)

Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB#3125—Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA Journal Metascience (...) Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, Number 1. (shrink)

The special issue, “Psychiatry and Its Philosophy,” focuses on addressing the mindbrain dualism and connected problems in the clinical and scientific contexts of psychiatry. Authors in this special issue address the theoretical disagreements that are manifest in the clinical and scientific goals of psychiatry and explore the possibility of reconciling the claim that research on psychopathology needs to be scientific with the claim that it needs to address the needs of patients in the clinic. Our approach is forward looking and (...) concerned with drawing on ideas and methods from the philosophy of science and philosophy of mind to promote pluralism in psychiatry. (shrink)

We argue that Quilty-Dunn et al.'s commitment to representational pluralism undermines their case for the language-of-thought hypothesis as the evidence they present is consistent with the operation of the other representational formats that they are willing to accept.

Au tournant du XIXe et du XXe siècle, l'ordre de la pensée, du savoir et des représentations a été ébranlé par la sociologie naissante. L'image de l'homme, de l'existence humaine, s'en est trouvée profondément bouleversée. Cette révolution sans morts ni barricades a en revanche fait de nombreuses victimes, à commencer par la philosophie. Face à l'idée d'une autonomie et d'une singularité irréductible des faits sociaux, parachevant le développement d'approches objectivistes de l'esprit humain, la philosophie s'est retrouvée acculée, sommée de se (...) redéfinir et d'abandonner à la sociologie, au moins provisoirement, les terrains de la morale et des conditions de possibilité de la connaissance. Avec Max Weber, Georg Simmel et Ferdinand Ttennies en Allemagne, Émile Durkheim et surtout Gabriel Tarde en France, la sociologie consacra, tout d'abord, le principe d'une pluralité de déterminations historiques et objectives pesant sur l'existence humaine. Elle ratifia, ensuite, l'avènement d'une conception nouvelle de la construction théorique, respectueuse de la complexité et de la force contraignante des faits ainsi que de la nature 'sociale' des catégories de pensée et des pratiques de production et de transmission des connaissances. Une grande partie de la philosophie du XXe siècle peut être lue comme une réponse à cette révolution cognitive. C'est ainsi que Henri Bergson, Georges Canguilhem, Martin Heidegger, William James, Karl Jaspers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty ou encore Bertrand Russell sont soumis, ici, à une grille d'analyse inédite. Un ouvrage aussi documenté qu'audacieux, qui offre la première histoire croisée de la sociologie et de la philosophie."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Traducimos al español el artículo de Marc Richir «Du rôle de la phantasia au théâtre et dans le roman», publicado en la revista Littérature, n.º 132 en diciembre de 2003. El artículo empieza conceptuando la diferencia fenomenológica entre phantasia e imaginación según Husesrl. Más adelante, el autor se detiene en el examen de la llamada phantasia «perceptiva», distinta tanto de la percepción como de la imaginación. La phantasia «perceptiva» le permite a Richir, junto a Husserl, abordar el análisis fenomenológico (...) del teatro y de sus paradojas, necesario preámbulo al análisis de lo que está en juego, fenomenológicamente, tanto en la escritura como en la lectura de una novela. (shrink)

Decoding the function and meaning of a foreign culture's sounds and gestures is a notoriously difficult problem. It is even more challenging when we think about the sounds and gestures of nonhuman animals. This essay provides a review of what is currently known about the informational content and function of primate vocalizations, emphasizing the problems underlying the construction of a primate “dictionary.” In contrast to the Oxford English Dictionary, this dictionary provides entries to emotional expressions as well as potentially referential (...) expressions. It therefore represents a guide to what animals do with their vocalizations, as well as how they are represented by signalers and perceivers. I begin by a discussion of the unit problem, of how an acoustic space is carved up into functionally significant components leading to a species‐specific repertoire or lexicon of sorts. This section shows how little we know about the units of organization within animal vocal repertoires, and how such lack of information constrains our ability to tackle the problem of syntactic structure. In Section III, I review research on the production and perception of vocal signals that appear to be functionally referential. This work shows that several nonhuman primates produce vocalizations that share some of the key properties of reference, but certainly not all; the components that are missing raises questions about their role as precursors to human words. In Section IV, I explore the social uses of vocalizations, assessing whether the signal contains sufficient information for listeners to judge a caller's credibility; ultimately, caller credibility determines how receivers select an appropriate response. Results show that individuals can use calls to assess whether someone is reliable or unreliable, and that such attributes are associated with individuals and particular contexts. I conclude by synthesizing the issues presented and then raise some directions for future conceptual and methodological progress. (shrink)

There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...) very multiple-realizability intuitions that motivate functionalism in the first place. For, according to those intuitions, it is possible for a being to experience pain, have beliefs, etcetera, and yet not only to be of a different species, but to have an entirely different material constitution from human beings. (shrink)

From 1923 to the present day, various studies have increasingly analysed the beginnings of the cult of Thomas Aquinas, as well as the authenticity of his works. Over the last century, the reception of Thomas Aquinas between these two poles of sanctity and the authority accorded to his works has shown itself to be a significant pairing, of which this article unpacks some important stages.

The risks associated with the techniques of medically assisted procreation (MAP) rapidly became well-known, and in such a short space of time that no biomedical domain remained untouched by the great deal of thinking and the expression of a multitude of opinions it provoked. MAP is evolving between two poles: quality/misuse (even violation) and evidence/fantasy. The ethics will be evoked in the clinical reality from which they spring and where their justification lies. The three objects common to these ethics, the (...) oocyte, the embryo and the child, are illustrated in this context. MAP has as its corollary access to the oocyte, the fertilization of which will take place in vitro. Access to the embryo, on the other hand, enables the clinician, for the purposes of diagnosis [preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), predictive medicine], or even soon for therapeutic purposes (gene therapy) to draw close to a boundary, to trespass beyond which may be seen by humanity to threaten its very origins and integrity: the alienation of the human genome. For the infertile couple, the missing child may take on a dimension of which they would have been unaware, had they not been forced to express their desire. The burden of the imaginary child may, in this way, become a heavier load to bear when, after such desire, he comes into being. MAP puts the goal of normalisation within reach and, in doing so, accentuates the risk of the burden of the attributed representation of the child. On the one hand, MAP offers a tremendous diagnostic and therapeutic potential, while on the other it opens the door to excess and delirium. In this melting pot, ethics, catalysed by this new source of problematics, has discovered a favourite area in which to define and redefine itself. We propose the intervention of ethics on three different levels. Before the elaboration of the law: on first reflection, ethics may influence the responsibilities of the legislator, by taking care that the law does not obscure the biomedical and socioeconomic contexts of MAP and, thereby, also include other related and complementary aspects dealing with the same subject. The secondary discussion of ethics should influence the application of legal protection, by taking into account the rapid technological and social development of MAP, there too, by discussing the whole, rather than the details which will obscure the object. The ethical reflection of the clinician, who is aware of these difficulties, is guided by elements that are specific to his position as a doctor. The cohesion of the team around the clinician and the ethics specialist enables us to develop consensual clinical ethics that are transmissible and therefore teachable. This complex role can, in our view, only be acted out directly in the clinical situation, where the constant, direct relationship with the object of the reflection and the treatment allows ethics to take into account the contingencies of medical practice: we invite the ethics specialist to take part in our clinical activity on a daily basis. (shrink)

The extent to which normative cognition varies across cultures has implications for a number of important philosophical questions. This chapter examines several striking commonalities and differences in normative cognition across cultures. We focus on cross-cultural commonality and difference in norm typologies (especially the moral-conventional distinction); the externalization of norms; which aspects of life are normativized; and some of the concepts and principles associated with the normative domain. We argue that the distinction between moral and conventional norms is probably not universal (...) and that several concepts and principles that have been suggested as candidate universals may in fact be culturally local. We nevertheless isolate two possible universals: the phenomenon of externalizing norms and the normativization of a preferred class of subject matters. (shrink)

Dans la pensée philosophique d'Emmanuel Levinas, le mot « Dieu » n'est pas inaudible. Il peut venir à l'idée. Il peut tomber sous le sens – en deçà de tout sens thématisé, à revers des prétentions souveraines de la conscience. À la condition toutefois que parvienne à être décrite l'intrigue anarchique que ce mot noue dans l'idée de l'Infini, dans le Visage, dans la Kénose du sujet, dans le Dire du verset ou l'Emphase de la métaphore.Les articles recueillis dans cet (...) ouvrage tentent, sous ces divers aspects, de décrire l'inouïe Transcendance de ce mot « Dieu » désormais arraché à toute archê – à tout fondement onto-théo-logique. Ils se hasardent aussi à suggérer les résonnances théologiques et bibliques de cet « autrement dire Dieu » préservant l'anarchie du Transcendant. C'est par le Haut que se noue tout vrai dialogue entre le philosophique et le théologique. (shrink)